1 Richard Holbrooke, then deputy-Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific, was, in 1980, a forceful spokesperson for that pragmatic support of Indonesia: "Indonesia, with a population of 150 million inhabitants, is the fifth most populated nation in the world. It has the largest Muslim population in the world, it is a moderate member of the Non Aligned Movement -it has a moderate role in OPEP -and occupies a strategic position along the maritime routes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. President Suharto and other prominent Indonesian leaders have publicly demanded the liberation of our hostages in Iran. The position of Indonesia in ASEAN is also important and it has played a central role in the support of Thailand (…) in face of Vietnamese desestabilization actions in Indochina (…). Indonesia is, without any doubt, important for our key allies in the region, especially Japan and Australia. We highly value our relationship of cooperation with Indonesia." (cit. in Horta, 1994: 162) . The then Permanent Representative of the U.S. in the UN, Daniel Moynihan, has written the following on his action concerning East Timor: "The United States wanted things to run the way they did, and acted in conformity. The State Department wanted the UN to be totally inefficient in whatever action it would take. I have been given this mission and I accomplished it with notable success" (1978: 247). determination were the major axis of the international Resistance and of the mobilisation of both non governmental and diplomatic allies.
Portugal, the United Nations and international solidarity groups always argued that East
Timor remained a non self-governing territory, according to Chapter XI of the UN Charter. This implied that Portugal continued to be the territory's administrative power until Timorese self-determination. Such a stance contested the (weak) Indonesian argument that annexation had been requested by a popular assembly composed by two representatives from each of the Timorese thirteen districts (with the exception of Dili, which had three representatives) and by ten leaders appointed by the interim government. The legal legitimacy argument against the fait accomplis also played a major role in condemning Indonesian's annexation. Most of the authors (Clark, 1980; Hannikainen, 1988; Cassese, 1995) have always denounced both the nonrepresentativity of such an assembly and the blatant violation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1541 (XV), 1961), where it establishes that integration "should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage." Notwithstanding this, it should be ackowledged that political and diplomatic action followed instead the dictates of realpolitik. In this context, Portugal's sustained effort for self-determination was frequently seen as a too strict policy, incapable of coping with the attempts for a peaceful solution to relieve the Timorese from suffering (Neves, 2000: 29) . Such argument found support in some Portuguese political leaders and actually guided the process' diplomatic course of action during the eighties. This shall be analysed furtheron.
The tension between legitimacy and fait accomplis also explains the contrast between silence and media as fundamental tools for the strategies of Indonesia and the Resistance: silence was considered a necessary condition for the successful creation of a fait accomplis, and led to the closure of the territory to journalists, NGO's and humanitarian assistance until 1988-89, as if it was a gigantic concentration camp; media, as an instrument for raising public awareness on the illegitimate situation in East Timor, has been an utmost priority of both the internal Resistance and the solidarity movements. Clearly, both sides tried to strategically convey the idea that knowledge is a way of (no) power.
Who Saved East Timor? New References to International Solidarity
Geopolitics and legal order
East Timor should be considered as one of the "hard cases" to test the validity of a certain theoretical reading of international life. Against a superficial antagonist perspective between pragmatism and idealism, the East Timor case has proved that realist cynicism (that lies exclusively on the cruel potency of geopolitics, expressed either by a pattern of indifference towards human suffering or by over-interventionism) and naive legalism (that over-emphasises the constructive role of formal obligations) are not the only ways to interpret the flow of history (Falk, 1998: 81) .
Realpolitik and power politics are the major categories of the realist common sense.
Within this framework, there can be no case for a superfluous people that inhabits half of a 19 000 square kilometres island in extremely poor conditions. On the other side, the legalistic reading of international politics tends to highlight a formal representation of reality (legal vs. illegal) void of any factual/power dimensions. In this context, East Timor should be seen as an obvious 'black and white' case of clear non-fulfilment of the basic principles of international law.
It should be underlined that there is no inherent conflict between geopolitics and the respect for international law. Falk has clarified this by stating: "When international law reinforces the political will of dominant states, it is likely to be invoked to support global policy initiatives (...). But when a reasonable interpretation of international law inhibits the preferred policies of strong states on matters of high priority, then the law will tend to be cast aside or ignored by its violators (...) " (1998: 58) .
East Timor brought something new to this traditional understanding: an alternative use of international rules and of geopolitical factors. International law has played a crucial role in the emancipation of the Timorese people. Both the already mentioned primary rules and secondary rules (mainly UN's resolutions from 1975 and 1982) have frozen the Indonesian pretensions and kept alive a legal understanding under which Portugal remained as administrative power until a legitimate act of self-determination had taken place. International norms concerning armed aggression, annexation and military occupation, genocide, torture, basic human rights and sovereignty over natural resources have played a major role in denouncing the situation (IPJET, 1995) . Both the Resistance and the solidarity movements have often used such rules as basic instruments to call the international community to a coherent position with its ideological discourse on Who Saved East Timor? New References to International Solidarity principles and decency. Not only as individual arguments but also as a discourse: in fact, as Escarameia (1993: 95) has demonstrated, the quest for legal legitimacy has been a permanent concern of the UN treatment of the case. Hence, the resolutions approved on this matter either expressly invoke or implicitly place authoritative documents (particularly fundamental declarations or previous resolutions) in a position of hierarchical superiority, provoking the effect of association of each decision with another one considered "more fundamental" and thus giving added historical and moral legitimacy to each legal step.
But despite this importance of the legal dimension of the case, the truth is that geopolitical factors, broadly speaking, have been essential not only to the strategy of Indonesia (as I have mentioned before) but also to the shift from fate into freedom.
Portugal's adhesion to the European Communities in 1986, the "CNN effect" of the Santa Cruz massacre (1991) and the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to José Ramos Horta and Bishop Belo (1996) , alongside with the consequences of the combination between the democratic transition in Indonesia and the economic crisis of the "eastern dragons" Taylor (1999: 222) synthetised: "actually it was the whole combination of strategies designed to suspend the sale of arms, associated with the threat of specific economical sanctions, directed towards the restructuring of banking and the debts of the big groups that, in the long run, seems to have pursuaded Habibie, his Cabinet, and the majority of his principal military personalities to accept the entry of a peacekeeping force."
Efficiency and multilateralism
The legacy of the East Timor case also includes a critique of the recent tendencies towards over-emphasizing efficiency as a criterion for international intervention.
Hopes for a multilateral consolidation of the political and conceptual approaches proposed by Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace seem to have been totally withered by the latest geopolitical shifts of power, the new security challenges and the impetuous economic force of globalisation. What seemed to be a return of the United Nations to its main role in the prevention, management and transformation of international conflicts, ended up with the organisation's political, financial and operational disbelief, creating the conditions for unilateralism to take place (Debiel, 2000) .
The debate on the alleged right to humanitarian intervention is a clear evidence of this tendency (Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995) . Those favouring this "right" invoke the failure of classical non-intervention rule and its progressive replacement by a postWestphalian right to enforce the accomplishment of basic human rights wherever gross violations occur and the right to use force if needed. Is there anything really new in this proposal ? Richard Falk (1998: 87) has expressed this doubt in question form: "are we dealing mainly with a change in discursive reality such that what has mainly changed is language, not behavior, with major states still retaining on a behavioral level a discretionary option to use force?" The dynamics created after the end of the Cold War has motivated this suspicion: instead of a move towards collective and institutionalised action, the nineties have evidenced "that the UN will be used (…) only when geopolitically useful, especially to provide a 'law-laundering' service, that is, to provide a kind of legitimizing mandate for what is, in its essence, a unilateral, or at best a use of force by a coalition of likeminded states" (ibidem: 66). Now, it should be reminded that this selectivity has been confirmed in several conflicts during the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia. And it should also be underlined that a few months before the dramatic destruction and massacre that followed the referendum, in September 1999, there had been a crucial step further into the unilateralist direction: NATO's intervention in former Yugoslavia without any kind of mandate from the Security Council, during the Kosovo crisis.
Within this context, the concrete procedure adopted for the creation of an international force of peace enforcing (INTERFET) (Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 th September 1999) has given back the primacy to multilateral decision-making structures, introducing a detour in the dominant tendency of the nineties.
The political price to pay for this option (or imposition?) was undoubtedly very highalthough one must always add, as Fernando Neves (2000: 38) reminds, that "the price to pay for Indonesian occupation was, and would be, more much intolerable: the destruction of an entire people". In line with the May 5 Agreement, which incongruously granted complete control of the territory's security to Indonesia, the Security Council immorally stood still after the referendum results were announced and the slaughter of the Timorese by Indonesian military and militia proceeded. The Security Council not only followed unclear formal procedures -promoting informal meetings over public debate (Monteiro, 2001: 19) -, but it was also continuously adamant not to affront Indonesia. Constantly attempting to persuade Indonesian authorities to act, the Security Council avoided until the last minute the adoption of In such a situation, similar to ethnic cleansing scenarios like Kosovo or Rwanda, the option for an intervention outside the multilateral institutionalism, namely a multinational regional force outside the UN, would have followed the unilateralist actions of the nineties. In this sense, the East Timor case legacy can be seen as encouraging "a more constitutionally oriented approach to the activities of the Security Council, thereby softening the current impression of its services as a geopolitical rubber-stamp" (Falk, 1998: 68) . It must be underlined that INTERFET's creation is equally relevant in a substantive way, since it translates not the traditional peace keeping or peace enforcing operations, but a new step in the international community's new tasks in post-conflict social reconstruction.
East Timor as a post-Westphalian struggle
The Timorese struggle for self-determination must be perceived as an important precedent of a post-Westphalian combat. For two main reasons: first, East Timor has remained as a topic of the international agenda due to the work of solidarity movements, much more than to the diplomatic initiatives of states and intergovernmental agenciesin this sense, Timor LoroSae is a product of pilgrim-citizenship; second, the role played by Portugal, the former colonial power, as an ally of the Timorese people and of the solidarity movements, and the articulation between the Portuguese diplomacy in the crucial areas of this process (human rights diplomacy, Security Council decisions, regional multilateral organisations, Decolonisation Committee, …) and those nongovernmental actors raise the question of the applicability of the militant state metaphor to Portugal in this specific case.
The role of pilgrim citizenship
Who Saved East Timor? New References to International Solidarity There is nothing new in the use of non-governmental instruments or the establishment of tactic alliances with non-governmental entities for the support of states' interests.
Portugal itself had previous experiences in this domain: for example, the use of the atlantist lobby in the United States against Kennedy's administration policy concerning Portuguese colonialism. Besides, the concrete structure of the solidarity movement in the East Timorese case has echoed some previous international references, like the antiapartheid movement or even the frontist experiences of anti-fascist solidarity and humanitarian assistance movements, and the way these movements had taken advantage of the growing importance of the media. 
Portugal: a militant state?
Can a state be compromised with a non-governmental emancipatory struggle? Can a government be an agent of international solidarity with a cause that does not deal with strategic geopolitical interests, that is, motivated only by genuine solidarity? Does a small state have some "comparative advantages" concerning this domain when compared to the major powers?
The role played by Portugal in the international solidarity movement with East Timor has been a fundamental one. In fact, for the better and for the worse, Portugal has been the diplomatic vehicle of the Timorese people's will to be self-determined. to find and 'honourable solution'. However, it found several difficulties in defending its 'national honour', due to its past actions, its contradictory approach and its 'flexibility' in main areas like self-determination and elections. " (1993: 329) Notwithstanding this obvious truth, it is also a fact that the Portuguese position has evolved a lot, and that the main responsible for that change have been both the internal Resistance of the Timorese and the non-governmental solidarity movement. This evolution can be analysed in four different phases.
The first one took place between 1975 and 1982. We could perhaps call it the phase of "multilateralism as the only way". The philosophy adopted by Portugal has been that the main contradiction of the Timor case was not between Portugal and Indonesia, but between Indonesia and the international community; and, being so, the United Nations should be confronted with its responsibilities in the case. The truth is that in fact the real actors in the diplomatic arena have been the African Portuguese-speaking countries, which kept the question alive in the intergovernmental settings. José Ramos-Horta Timor" was demanded, and the result was 59 in favour, 11 against and 55 abstentions.
These last ones were from the Arab and western countries and this, according to Ramos Horta (1994: 184) , was interpreted in Jakarta as a 'carte blanche' to continue East Timor's annexation process. This means that the multilateralisation was merely a passive one, since Portugal showed an almost absolute lack of capacity of influencing the decisions of the UN.
Having actively participated in the UN follow-up of the Timorese file, Antonio Monteiro describes this phase as follows: "Indonesia had all the interestson its side and was supported by the most influential members of the international community ready to safeguard their political and economic gains; Portugal (and East Timor) had the values on their side… (…). It was a stable balance that in no way burdened the international community. Typical in such situations, the first one to break the balance could be 'punished'. Only that circumstance justified Jakarta's tactic: defending itself from an annual resolution, whilst trying to attract new allies so that with time the issue could be ).
5 Such articulation was not, however, free from serious gaps and omissions. Referring to 1993 , José Ramos Horta (1994 exemplifies how his pledges for support from the Portuguese state to employ Bruce Cameron, lobbying specialist in Washington, were ignored by Lisbon. It was the international solidarity movement (Galeria Nazoni, Cooperativa Árvore and Maubere People's Rights Commission) that paid such a crucial initiative. 6 The Resistance, both inside the country and outside, had early realised the strategic relevance of international human rights fora for the Timorese fight. It is thus particularly important that the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, happened precisely when the UN Human Rights Commission's representative was in Dili, engaging dialogue with local authorities. This reinforcement of the Portuguese diplomacy militant character did not merely result in the growing international affirmation of the Resistance and international solidarity's struggle for independence. It also meant an intensification of the Indonesian forces' control and repression in the territory. The arrest and trial of Xanana Gusmão, in 1992, was the first step of an operation led by the Indonesian military special forces (Kopassus) to identify and "clean" those in favour of independence (Taylor, 1999: 197) .
Hence, the years that followed the Santa Cruz massacre witnessed a radical intensification of positions, and it is within this context that the intensification of Portugal's diplomatic work must be seen. Indonesian leadership, aware of that relevance, was forced to take the "impossible step": in January 1999, President Habibie, faced with international refusal of his proposal of a special autonomy regime for East Timor, announced the invader's availability to withdraw. "I shall prove to the world that I can make an important contribution to world peace (…). It will roll like a snowball and no one will be able to stop it." More clear After twenty-four years of oppression and ordail, the people of East Timor was at last able to exercise its right to self-determination. Until independence is formally declared, Timor will remain a non-autonomous territory, since the administrative power of the territory was transferred from Portugal (de jure authority) and Indonesia (de facto authority) to the United Nations -that created the United Nations Transitory Administration in East Timor. UNTAET had three main responsibilities: government and public administration, humanitarian and emergency rehabilitation, and military. It had a very wide mandate, including the provision of security and the maintenance of law and order throughout the territory, the assistance in the development of civil and social services, as well as ensuring the coordination and relief of humanitarian assistance and the support of capacity building for self-government, whilst promoting the establishment of conditions leading to a future sustainable development (Galvão Teles, 1999: 420) .
Legally speaking, the United Nations has mere non-sovereign administration powers, such as in Western Iran (UNTEA), Cambodia (UNTAC), Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) or in Kosovo (UNMIK). The uniqueness of the Timorese contribution to international solidarity historical patrimony also lays in the several questions raised by the mandate's wideness, namely regarding whether this is a crucial precedent in the United Nations' new tasks in the contemporary world. security aims at defining obligations, mainly Indonesian ones, on the guarantee of order during and after the referendum. James Traub qualifies UNTAET's mission in a meaningful way: "an exercise in benevolent colonialism " (2000: 75) . This sustains Edward Luttwak's provocative hypothesis that, in most of the cases, UN multilateral interventions aiming at putting an halt to systematic and massive violation of fundamental human rights "cannot be mere raids or visitations à la Somalia", but "they must instead lead to the establishment of UN protectorates that can build infrastructures, provide education, and administer all the necessary functions of civil government. Of necessity the duration of these protectorates is more likely to be measured in decades rather than in years" (2000: 62).
Timor can thus be seen as a small-scale rehearsal of UN new tasks, which bring together post-Westphalian motivations (universal protection of human rights) with typically Westphalian views (building the nation-state based on administrative and civil chaos).
This immediately raises two kinds of problems and concerns. First, despite being called benevolent, colonial attitude is at the opposite of emancipatory practice. Well-known testimonies of UNTAET's members confirm this reserve. Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos, from UNTAET's Political, Constitutional and Electoral Affairs Department, points out that "the vaguely neo-colonial approach, resulting from the marriage between the politically correct American academy and Indiana Jones attitude in exotic scenarios, gives rise to a gaping inability to understand the Timorese, to get on with them, and to understand what is important for this last lap of transition to independence" (interview in "Público", 26.12.2000) . Another UNTAET high member, Jarat Chopra denounces that "the United Nations, in the field, works as if it was in New York. (…) keeping them [the Timorese] from entering the administration was a deliberate strategy, of those who wanted to concentrate the maximum number of UN officials in their teams, to increase their power in the system. Because they think that, if they fail their mission, that will harm their curriculum. When that becomes the only reason to act, it starts to affect the chain of events" (interview in "Expresso", 7.7.201).
Another problem joins this first one. The rise and time length of UN tasks makes it even more dependent of states' financing, as well as of related political will to commit to long-term and potentially unproductive expenditures. Now, it is obvious that the conditions are created for the principal contributing states for the UN -the ones who have repeatedly expressed not being available for the responsibilities in the "business" of building countries -to demand that the Organisation's actions be supported by
